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STATE SUPREME COURT JUDGE VERSUS UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT JUSTICE: A CHANGE
IN FUNCTION AND PERSPECTIVE*
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.**
Mr. Justice Jackson said of the Supreme Court, "We are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are
final."' I am told that law review editors consider this claim to
the last word to be mere pretension. It overlooks the court of law
review editors, which regularly on Tuesdays reverses Monday's Supreme Court decisions and spends the school year energetically finding
fault with last term's decisions proving, at least to the editors' satisfaction, that all of the Justices were wrong. I am particularly intrigued when law reviews tell me what I meant by what I wrote. It
can be a revelation.
But I should not be facetious. "'The law,' said Bentham, 'is not
made by judge alone, but by judge and company.'"2 This means, as
a recent observer remarked, "We take our judicial law . . . not

merely from nine men, but from a profession - with all that implies
in intellectual discipline and in standards rooted in tradition."' 3 The
role that the profession as a whole plays by subjecting the Court's
work to informed criticism and appraisal and by producing disinterested scholarship can be plainly, sometimes spectacularly, traced in
the development of all branches of our law.
In earlier days the nexus between the Supreme Court and the
profession was chiefly an intimate, well informed, specialized, largely
resident Supreme Court Bar. One thinks of Daniel Webster, William
Wirt, Pinkney, and others of that select company so tightly knit that
upon the demise of a colleague, fellow members wore crepe on the
4
left arm as a mark of respect for his illustrious talents.
Such a Bar is no more. Today fewer and fewer lawyers, aside
from the handful - albeit the very distinguished handful in the offices of the Solicitor General of the United States,
*Address prepared for the annual University of Florida Law Review Banquet,
September 20, 1966.
**Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States.
1. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953).
2. As quoted in BicKEL, PoLrrxcs AND THE WARREN COURT 142 (1965).

3. Id. at 142.
4. Id. at 142-43.
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appear regularly before the Supreme Court and regularly
scrutinize its work. Most lawyers who come there now pay
the Court only episodic attention. I do not mean that the practicing bar as a whole has lost touch with the work of the
Court; certainly not the organized bar. But there has been a
change. The place of an intimate Supreme Court Bar has
been taken by the academic branch of the profession, which
has itself become established and accepted only since the turn of
the century, in the wake of the very changes that have caused
the disappearance of the Supreme Court Bar as a discrete
group.
The role of the law review in this changed order is readily apparent. Within its covers is found the scholarship of those who make
it their business to analyze and appraise the work of the Court. There
also is published the work product of students who labor under
faculty guidance to produce timely and informative commentary of
the most painstaking sort. "We should . . . draw much assurance
from that contribution, for it serves to enhance the intellectual integrity of the judicial process and is in its modest way one of the
influences that keep judicial law rationally responsive to the needs
of the day." 5
Now I must not leave the misleading impression that I find
intellectual disinterestedness and basic research of the most painstaking sort in everything I find in law reviews, even in so distinguished a journal as the University of Florida Law Review. So often
I have concluded the reading of law review notes and articles with
a feeling of: "If only I felt as sure about anything as those fellows
feel about everything."
I congratulate each of you who has the distinction of law review
editor. The achievement of mastering one's studies so well as to earn
election to a law review is no minor accomplishment. That achievement must have brought home to you, as nothing else can, that the
law is not an end in itself nor does it provide ends. Ours is an exacting profession, a learned profession in which, as you have learned
from your review experience, powers of intellect and industry bear
rich fruit. Carry that invaluable lesson with you as you start upon
your careers. If you have learned it well, it will soon become apparent that your studies have not ended but only begun. Accordingly
your contribution to a better rule of law for the nation, and hopefully
for the world, should be the greater for your experience as members
of this distinguished review.

5.

Id. at 144.
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I was uncertain what, with propriety, I might talk about tonight.
Mr. Justice Sanford used to say that before coming to the Court,
speechmaking was no problem for him. He would select a maxim "All is not gold that glitters" - "A rolling stone gathers no moss" "A penny saved is a penny earned," or the like, and talk at length
upon it. He discovered, however, that on the Court it was not befitting a Justice to discuss even these subjects. It is a part of Court
tradition - one of the better traditions I think - that Justices should
be circumspect in utterance past the revelation of their views in their
opinions. However, a comment recently made to me by one of my
former law partners suggested what I think is a wholly appropriate
subject. He said he thought some recent opinions of mine indicated
that I had changed some views I had expressed when a member of
the New Jersey Supreme Court. In reply I suggested to my old friend
that perhaps what to him seems to reflect a changed viewpoint, may
with greater accuracy be said to reflect a change of function. For
unmistakably, a high state court judge and a United States Supreme
Court Justice must often look at the same case with different eyeglasses. Our states are not mere provinces of an all powerful central
government. They are political units with hard-core constitutional
status and with plenary governmental responsibility for much that
goes on within their borders. Yet at the same time, states are units of
the nation and in our federal structure held to the commands of the
national constitution and the national laws.
It is not surprising that the state judge faced with a case presenting
a conflict of state interests and the national constitution and laws will
sometimes react in a way that reflects zealousness to maintain the
integrity of his state's sovereign powers. Nor is it surprising that he
is occasionally stirred to resentment when the United States Supreme
Court reaches a different judgment on the question whether the state
action he approves must give way to the commands of the national
constitution and laws. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that in
ratifying our national constitution, the founding states accepted the
express constitutional provisions that provide for supremacy of the
national constitution and national laws in proper cases. Indeed, the
very first Congress enacted as one of its first laws the Judiciary Act of
1789, which explicitly delegated to the Supreme Court the function
of finally passing on the question whether actions of the states violated
the federal constitution or laws. Even if we assume that this function
might have been reserved to the Congress or have been assigned to
some other tribunal, the hard fact is that since our beginnings as a
nation, it has been and yet remains a function required by law to be
exercised by the Supreme Court. The word "usurpative" has a
strange ring when applied to this function. As Professor Charles

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XIX

Black has said in his interesting little book The People and the
Court-"[T]he Court did not arrogate this function to itself; it was
7
directed by Congress to assume it." He goes on to say:
Nothing could be more obvious, [yet] nothing arouses greater
occasional resentment, than the fact that the states must be
subjected, as a last resort, to the requirements of the national
Constitution and laws. Nothing could be more obvious, [yet]
nothing raises this occasional resentment to higher pitches or
fury than the fact that, in the real world, this must mean that
the actions of the states have to be submitted to control and
possible invalidation by some national tribunal. Nothing could
be more obvious, [yet] nothing could inspire resentment to
shriller tones of invective, than the fact that, again in the real
world, the national Constitution and laws to which the states
must be subjected can be nothing else than the national
Constitution and laws as interpreted by the national tribunal
entrusted with this task of supervision, even though that interpretation may in some particular case not be the one
arrived at, or even passionately held, by the dominant interest
in the affected state.
In practice the Supreme Court Justice cannot look at a state case
at all unless a claim is made that the action in issue violates a federal
right. The high state court judge, on the other hand, must examine
all the questions in the case, and this includes the federal questions.
Professor Black suggests that when the state judge passes on the
federal questions, he may be at a disadvantage for he "utters the
best understanding of the state as to the meaning of commands placed
upon the whole nation, by the whole nation, for the benefit of the
whole nation. The finally authoritative utterance, in such a case,
must be that of someone who represents the whole nation."'
The 1789 act nominated the Supreme Court to be the national voice
in this regard and "the Supreme Court reviewed its first state court
case [and the state court cases it has since reviewed] in obedience to
a direct command laid on it in a statute passed by the First Congress
and signed into law by President Washington."9
Perhaps I can best illustrate the different functions of the high
state court judge and the Supreme Court Justice in state cases by
telling you of four cases decided while I was on the New Jersey

6. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND
7. Id. at 120-21.
8. Id. at 128.
9. Id. at 130.

THE COURT

128 (1960).
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court, which raised problems that have subsequently come before
me on the Supreme Court in other cases.
First, however, to put the situation in proper perspective, the review of state cases for test of state action against the commands of
the national constitution and laws is involved in only a small percentage of the cases we decide each year. The larger part of our
time involves determining the constitutionality of laws and orders
made by Congress and the executive branch, interpreting the meaning
and application of federal statutes, ascertaining whether the actions
of the numerous federal agencies are within bounds, and supervising
the administration of criminal justice in federal courts. Such cases
present problems of a nature not at all unfamiliar to the high state
court judge because most of them have their counterparts in the
judicial grist that arises under state constitutions and state governments similar in form. Accordingly, the former state judge who comes
to the Supreme Court finds that his state court experience, with the
principles and techniques guiding judgment in cases of that kind, can
be very helpful. Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court must examine
state judicial action, the former state judge finds that his new vantage
point often requires him to affirm state court action that he disapproved as a state judge or to disapprove state court action that he
found correct as a state judge. Let me proceed to my four illustrative
cases.
The first of the cases involved the question whether state courts
could act to regulate peaceful organizational picketing where the
National Labor Relations Board had declined jurisdiction on the
ground that while the particular business was in commerce and subject to its jurisdiction the amount of business involved did not warrant the Board's attention,1o The business picketed was a retail store
of a national jewelry chain. The New Jersey trial court enjoined
the picketing maintaining that if the National Board would not act,
the state courts should so that the employer would not be denied all
remedy. When the case came to the New Jersey Supreme Court it was
urged that the preemption doctrine as applied to these cases, a doctrine then in process of evolution in cases before the United States
Supreme Court, excluded the operation of state law as to businesses
in commerce despite the National Labor Relations Board's refusal
to accept jurisdiction, yet there was no decision of the United States
Supreme Court so holding. In fact, what statements there were
touching the question in opinions might be read as recognizing state
power in the circumstances. Although the injunction was reversed
on other grounds, the opinion I wrote for the New Jersey court
10. Busch & Sons v. Retail Union of N.J., 15 N.J. 226, 104 A.2d 448 (1954).
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adopted the view that if the National Board declined jurisdiction, the
states necessarily were free to apply their own law.
It was not long after I came to the Supreme Court that the precise
question was presented in a case from the Supreme Court of Utah.1
Plainly enough my function was now different from what it was on
the New Jersey court. The Supreme Court, as the ultimate judicial
authority for interpretation of the meaning and scope of federal
legislation, was squarely faced with deciding whether the federal act
left any latitude for state power merely because the National Board
administering that act declined jurisdiction of a case concededly
within its jurisdiction. Looking at the problem from that standpoint,
I found I had to conclude that the area over which Congress had
exercised its legislative power was wide indeed, and, correspondingly,
that the area within which the states may continue to operate was
very narrowly drawn. Congress had formulated a comprehensive
code of conduct that both described and protected the rights of employees to organize and engage in concerted union activity. Against
this background it seemed apparent that Congress had intended to
deprive the states of all regulatory power, without exception for
cases in which the National Board declined to exercise its jurisdiction.
In other words, the state oriented view of the state judge had no place
in the exercise of the new function.
But I suppose the problems in the preemption area hardly present
the difficulties and complexities of challenges to state action under
the fourteenth amendment. Since that amendment was first passed
some ninety years ago, the function of umpire of our federalism
has become particularly delicate. Every enactment of every state,
every action by the governor of a state, and any judicial action of any
state may in a proper case be challenged at the bar of the Supreme
Court on the ground that such action, such legislation, such judicial
decision is a deprivation of liberty without due process of law or
denies equal protection of the laws. What is "due" and what is
"equal" present the Court with some of the most troublesome among
the always difficult problems that it must resolve.
The case of State v. Tune,'12 which first came before me on the
New Jersey Supreme Court, is illustrative of the change in perspective
possible in the area of the fourteenth amendment. An accused charged
with murder made a confession after prolonged interrogation. Two
months or more after he signed the confession counsel were assigned
to defend him. The accused had not been given a copy of the confession and had no memory of its contents. His counsel applied to

11.
12.

Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
17 N.J. 100, 110 A.2d 99 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 907 (1955).
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the court for an order directing the prosecutor to supply a copy or at
least to allow counsel to read the signed confession. The application
was denied, and the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, with me
and two others in dissent. The majority saw the problem as merely
one of pretrial discovery in criminal cases. Since state constitutional
guarantees prevented evenhanded discovery, the majority concluded
that a procedure not available to the state against the accused should
not be available to the accused even if limited to discovery of his
own confession. In dissent I expressed outrage that an accused with
life at stake should not be allowed a copy of his own confession,
especially when insurance companies are required to provide plaintiffs
with copies of their signed statements prior to trial in ordinary negligence suits.
When presented before the Supreme Court the question became
whether New Jersey's refusal to allow pretrial discovery of the accused's own confession denied due process, or perhaps, whether denial
of pretrial examination of prior statements in criminal cases, while
providing for it in civil cases, offended the guarantee of equal protection of the laws. The case did not come to the Supreme Court directly
from the New Jersey court. Rather it came on review of the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit 13 affirming a district court's denial of
federal habeas corpus sought after the accused was convicted and
sentenced to death, a conviction and sentence that had been affirmed
by the New Jersey court. Whether New Jersey's action offended the
fourteenth amendment, implicated principally the extent to which
the guarantees of that amendment circumscribed a state's power to
fashion discovery procedures to be applied in criminal causes in its
courts. Since the fourteenth amendment, as presently interpreted by
the Court, does not command the states to have any particular form
of discovery practice in criminal cases or, indeed, any discovery practice
at all, and since there was no particular constitutional infirmity
otherwise disclosed by the facts of the case; I had to agree that there
was no error in the lower court's denial of habeas corpus. Quite
clearly my expressed sense of outrage at the procedure while on the
New Jersey court was not an appropriate consideration. Innumerable
state decisions are invulnerable to attack under the fourteenth
amendment without regard to my personal views of their soundness.
Obviously the Supreme Court may not intrude merely because the
state court result offends its members' sensibilities.
The next case is State v. Hoag,14 which involved successive prosecutions for the same criminal act. Five patrons of a tavern were the
the victims of an armed robbery. New Jersey first indicted Hoag for
13.
14.

Application of Tune, 230 F.2d 883, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 987 (1956).
21 N.J. 496, 122 A.2d 628, aff'd, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
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the armed robbery of three of the patrons. On the trial of that indictment Hoag was acquitted. New Jersey then secured Hoag's indictment for the robbery of a fourth victim. Hoag unsuccessfully
pleaded double jeopardy in violation of the New Jersey constitution.
While the state's evidence was virtually the same as that at the former
trial, Hoag was convicted. His appeal came to the New Jersey Supreme Court while I was a member of that court. The conviction was
sustained with myself and two colleagues in dissent. The majority
held that the first prosecution for the robbery of A, B, and C was for
a different offense from the second prosecution for the robbery of D,
even though the robberies were committed simultaneously. The view
of the dissent, which I joined, was that the test of double jeopardy, in
light of the history and purpose of that guarantee, was whether the
accused was being harassed by successive trials. Was he being required
to marshal more than once the resources and energies necessary for
his defense of what essentially was the same alleged criminal act?
By that test it was clear to me that Hoag's defense of double jeopardy
was valid and should have defeated the second prosecution.
After I came on the Supreme Court, however, we were confronted
with Abbate v. United States.15 During a strike against the Southern
Bell Telephone Company, the defendants conspired in Chicago to
dynamite substations of the telephone company located in Mississippi.
The substations carried coaxial cables, which were essential parts of
our federal military communications system. The State of Illinois
indicted the defendants for conspiracy to injure or destroy the
property of another in violation of an Illinois statute. The defendants
pleaded guilty to that indictment and were sentenced to an Illinois
prison. Thereafter, the defendants were indicted in a federal court
for conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States, namely
to destroy a communication system operated and controlled by the
United States. The defendants interposed the defense of double
jeopardy. It was overruled, and they were convicted. Plainly enough
the defendants, like Hoag, were being subjected to successive prosecutions. The acts, which were the basis of the federal prosecutions,
were the same acts that were the basis of the Illinois convictions.
However, I wrote the opinion for the Court sustaining the federal
prosecution. How did I differ Hoag? Hoag involved successive prosecutions by the same sovereignty, the State of New Jersey. Abbate, on
the other hand, involved a federal prosecution following a state
prosecution. Abbate, therefore, raised the question of the scope of
the fifth amendment provision against subjecting an accused "for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." But the
15.

359 U.S. 187 (1959).
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federal government had not put Abbate and his codefendants to the
harassment of successive trials. There were successive trials for the
same acts, but the first was a state trial and the second was a federal
trial. We held that the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment was a guarantee only as against successive federal prosecutions,
that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against both and may be punished by each. This
was more than a mere distinction of form. It was a distinction compelled, as I thought, by our concept of federalism. My earlier views
as state judge in Hoag, inveighing against the successive trials and
punishments for the same criminal act, gave way to the demands of
federalism.
Finally, there is the particularly sensitive area of federal habeas
corpus. This was involved in another case on which I sat as a member of the New Jersey court. In State v. DeVita,16 three young men
committed a robbery murder on Newark's crowded main street one
busy Saturday afternoon. All three were convicted. Two of them
received the death sentence and the third life imprisonment. We of
the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the convictions
and sentences. 17 The United States Supreme Court refused review.18
Thereafter a motion was made in the trial court for a new trial on
the ground that one of the jurors had been the victim of an armed
robbery on the same street only a short time before the murder and
had not disclosed this fact before being accepted as a juror. The motion was denied, and we of the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously affirmed.10 Again the United States Supreme Court denied
review. 2 0 An alleged federal constitutional infirmity in the conviction
arising from the juror's conduct was asserted in the motion for
a new trial, but the New Jersey Supreme Court turned its affirmance
primarily on state law and procedure. The opinion, however, did
refer to the fact that a motion for a new trial had asserted a denial
of due process of law. Thereafter federal habeas corpus was suc2
cessfully sought in the United States District Court. '
The federal habeas corpus statute was adopted by Congress almost
a century ago. It expanded federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to embrace all persons allegedly restrained of their liberty in violation of
the federal constitution, including persons detained under authority
of state law. What constitutes a state denial of federal constitutional
16. 16 N.J. 103, 106 A.2d 294 (1954).
17. State v. GriUo, I1 N.J. 173, 93 A.2d 328 (1952).
18. DeVita v. New Jersey, 845 U.S. 976 (1953).
19. State v. DeVita, 16 N.J. 103, 106 A.2d 294 (1954).
20. DeVita v. New Jersey, 346 U.S. 923 (1954).
21. United States ex tel. DeVita v. McCorkle, 138 F. Supp. 169 (D.N.J. 1955).
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rights in the prosecution and conviction of an accused under state
laws must ultimately be determined by the United States Supreme
Court which has the responsibility for constitutional interpretation.
The various ways in which state criminal prosecutions offend due process and equal protection of the laws have been enumerated over the
years in Supreme Court decisions. While the obligation rests upon
state courts, equally with the federal courts, to guard, enforce, and
protect every right granted or secured by the federal constitution;
Congress has provided a remedy in the Federal Habeas Corpus Act,
which allows for adjudication of such constitutional claims. The rub
has been that state judges have expressed irritation that this statute
allows intervention of lower federal courts in the habeas corpus process. State judicial tempers often rise to the boiling point when they
contemplate the possibility that lower federal courts may set aside
state criminal convictions that have been sustained by the state's
highest court, particularly when the state court decision has been denied review by the United States Supreme Court. I can remember
sharing the indignation of my colleagues on the New Jersey court
when it was apparent that a single federal district judge could set
aside the DeVita convictions which our court had sustained after considerable attention and which the Supreme Court had twice denied
review. At the time it was my belief that the respect due a sovereign
state's highest court required that its judgments be reviewed only
by the federal tribunal charged with the responsibility to speak the
final word. Accordingly, I was among those who supported a proposal, then before Congress, which would have required in effect that
substantially all applications for writs of federal habeas corpus on
behalf of state prisoners be made directly to the Supreme Court.
Today my view is entirely different. I more fully appreciate the
essential necessity for the federal habeas corpus statute if alleged
federal constitutional infirmities in state convictions are to be heard
and adjudicated. Many of these cases depend on factfinding which
is not made at the original trial. For example, the facts bearing on
a claim that the conviction was obtained through the knowing use
by the state of perjured evidence would not be found in the trial
record. Accordingly, direct review by the United States Supreme
Court of the original trial record would not present such a federal
constitutional claim. Where is the necessary record to be made? We
would hope that it could be made in some state post-conviction procedure. It is unfortunate, but true, that too many state post-conviction procedures are not adequate. Indeed, many which in form are
adequate to deal with such questions, require presentation by a
skilled lawyer. But the states, by and large, do not require representation by a lawyer, and, of course, our Court has not yet said that
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the fourteenth amendment requires that states make provision for
representation by counsel in post-conviction proceedings. The prisoner must struggle along as best he can through the maze of techniques which often confront him under state procedures. Until the
states provide procedures adequate to permit a hearing and adjudication of such federal constitutional claims, I see no alternative but the
maintenance of a federal habeas corpus procedure for the determination of these claims. There is an encouraging trend in many states
toward the adoption of adequate procedures.2 2 If such procedures
were to be generally adopted, the reason for state judicial irritation
toward the federal habeas corpus procedure should largely disappear.2 3
Resort to the lower federal court procedure would not be needed so
often, and federal judicial review could be limited to that allowed
by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Certainly, the original proposal to Congress for eliminating the
lower federal courts and confining federal habeas corpus relief to
that sought in the Supreme Court would, I think, have been most unfortunate legislation. That proposal, if enacted, would have unduly
increased the work of a court whose burden already is a matter of
concern to students of its function. Indeed, the proposal might even
fail of its purpose. Even one with a passing acquaintance with the
Court's work knows that it is not constituted to hear and decide contested applications for habeas corpus. Necessarily, then, where facts
not to be found in the trial records have to be developed, the Court
would have no alternative but to refer the application to some
special master, probably a district judge, to make the record and
report his findings and conclusions to the Supreme Court. Even
such a procedure as that would not justify inundating us with the
great volume of such applications now brought in all the nation's
federal district courts. To do so, I think, would seriously threaten
our capacity to handle other business. If restrictions on existing
federal habeas corpus practice are desirable at all, they must not be
such as to saddle the Supreme Court with an impossible burden.
Recently, a new proposal has been submitted to Congress as a
substitute for the original one. Under that proposal no habeas
corpus relief could be granted except by a three-judge federal district
court, although single district judges would have power to screen applications and some power to deny relief. The courts of appeals
would be eliminated from the channel of appellate review and that
22. Florida has revised its procedures in this area. FrA. R. Crut. P. 1. For a
general discussion see Note, Florida's Criminal Procedure Rule Number One, 17
U. FLA. L. Rav. 617 (1965).
23. Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965); see Brennan, Some Aspects of
Federalism, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 945, 957-59 (1964).
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review would be limited to the discretionary review of the Supreme
Court by way of a petition for certiorari. I will not stop to discuss
that proposal. Suffice it to say my views of federal habeas corpus
have no resemblance to my attitude when a state judge, and I welcome any opportunity that comes my way to acquaint other state
judges with my reasons for a change in attitude.
Now none should mistake the difference in character of the functions for a difference in the exacting nature of the tasks performed by
the judges of both state and federal supreme courts. Actually the
composite work of the courts of the fifty states probably has greater
significance in measuring how well America attains the ideal of equal
justice for all. The state courts of all levels must annually hand down
literally millions of decisions which determine vital issues of life,
liberty, and property of human beings of this nation. Even the yearly
total of decisions handed down by the highest courts of the fifty
states must run into the tens of thousands. We should remind ourselves that it is these state court decisions which finally determine the
overwhelming aggregate of all legal controversies in this nation. Of
course, our system of justice only intrudes the Supreme Court between
the state courts and litigants in that most narrow class of litigation
which deals with federal questions. How infinitesimally small that
class is. Last term in only a few hundred state cases did losers knock
on the Supreme Court's door seeking review of state court judgments
against them. Nine out of ten of even that scant number did not
get in. We turned away ninety-three per cent. We could find less
than seventy-five cases which justified our inquiry into the merits of
what the state courts had done. Even federal habeas corpus practice
annually brings a relatively small number of state criminal cases to
the point of hearing in the district courts. You will remember Mr.
Justice Cardozo's views on the relative significance of his state and
Supreme Court service. He said: "[W]hether the new field of usefulness is greater I don't know. Perhaps the larger opportunity was
where I have been."
In the handful of cases in which both the state courts and the
Supreme Court function, the correct analysis of their respective responsibilities for decision is not in terms of which has the greater
and which the lesser burden. The responsibilities are of the same
gravity. The difference lies merely in the fact that the Supreme Court
has the final word on federal questions. Judges of both courts, like
other human beings responsible for other human institutions, are
on the dubious waves of error tossed. But in performing their respective tasks in cases where both must function, there can be no reason for contest, not even for petty quarrel.
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Doubtless you wonder whether I believe that prior state judicial
service is good preparation for service on the Supreme Court. Apparently the Presidents who have appointed Justices in this century
have not valued state court service too highly.24 Of course, I believe
that it is. However, I do not think that it can be fairly maintained
that prior state judicial service is necessarily a preferred preparation.
The point may not be what particular prior experience it would be
well for all nine Justices to have. I have misgivings whether it
would be desirable to have a Court of nine who had the same preparation. As an institution having unique responsibilities the Court is
best served when it can draw its members from among all the diverse
roles followed by the legal profession.
I have enjoyed this visit very much. Thank you for inviting me.

24. Since 1900 only three appointments have been made from the ranks of
state supreme court justices: Holmes, 1902; Cardozo, 1927; and Brennan, 1956.
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